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I. INTRODUCTION
i
In the past half-century of psychological theorizing
and research, there has been a growing interest in the con-
cepts of mental illness and moral development. These areas
both have man as their common element, but attempts to look
at their interconnections have previously been clouded by in-
adequate knowledge of the separate elements themselves.
Since this thesis concerns those interconnections, a clearer
and more concise exposition of the moral-interpersonal world
of the emotionally disturbed is perhaps called for.
Theory To begin on a broad base, the works of Martin
Buber provide an inspiring and insightful philosophy of the
Interpersonal nature of man. For Buber (1965), "The basis
of man's life with man is twofold, and it is one— the wish
of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he
can become, by men; and the innate capacity in man to con-
firm his fellow-men in this way [p. 102]." In contrasting
the I-Thou world of mutuality and relation with the I-It
world of experiencing and using, Buber makes vivid the life
lived between man and man, the life of dialogue. In order
to fulfill his twofold nature, man must create a separate
self (I) with which to face the world, and yet must also
enter into relation with others (Thou). It becomes each
person's responsibility and claim to live toward, rather
than away from, others, to be present when another makes a
2demand or a call.
A tendency Buber perceived in the early forms of psy-
chotherapy, particularly Freudian and Jungian analysis, was
its almost exclusive concentration on the self, on the psy-
chological state of the individual. Buber (1965) points
out the inherent contradiction in such an approach, writing
"The inmost growth of the self is not accomplished in man's
relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and
the other, between men... [p. 104]." In Buber's system, then,
emotional problems are viewed as failures of dialogue, ex-
periences of unnatural isolation from the world of community.
Whatever the causes, "A soul is never sick alone, but there
is always a between-ness also, a situation between it and
another existing being." (Buber, 1967
,
p. 1^2) Therapists
who have closely followed Buber's philosophy see the goal
of therapy as one of helping a stronger self develop, and
then turning this self towards the world of others. One
such therapist, Hans Trub (1964), describing the second
phase of therapy, says he "steps over to the side of the
implicated world and expects of the patient, by this time
potentially healthy, that he now break out of the self-
incarceration and turn towards the world with his whole soul
...[p. 499]."
Boss (1963), a disciple of Heidegger's and pioneer of
Dasein-analytic therapy, also raises the sights of psychology
from the personal to the interpersonal, from the psychological
to the dlaloglcal:
For we never exist primarily as different subjects
who only secondarily enter into interpersonal re-lations with one another and exchange ideas aboutthe objects all of us perceive. Instead, as anydirect observation shows, we are all out there in
the world together, primarily and from the begin-
ning, with the same things shining forth in the com-
mon light of all our existences, [p. 55]
In his discussion of emotional problems, Boss claims that
"no psychopathological symptom will ever be fully and ade-
quately understood unless it is conceived of as a disturb-
ance in the texture of the social relationships of which a
given human existence fundamentally consists ... all psychi-
atric diagnoses are basically only sociological statements
[p. 56]."
One essential aspect of the interpersonal world Is the
area of moral judgment. Moral questions revolve around a
concern for and an awareness of other's needs and rights.
Morality cannot be an issue in an interpersonal vacuum, for
it requires some kind of relationship to exist between men.
Both Buber and Boss stress the responsibility inherent in
living with others, and discuss the guilt that results from
a failure to meet these responsibilities. But perhaps
Mowrer (1961) is the most direct in discussing this connec-
tion between interpersonal life, morality, and mental ill-
ness. According to Mowrer "Man is preeminently a social
creature and... he lives or dies, psychologically and person
ally, as a function of the openness, community, relatedness
4and integrity which by good action he attains and by evil
action destroys [p. 44]." The central issue for Mowrer is
how the individual has treated others, how he has dealt with
the demands and calls of mutuality. His deceptively simple
point is that "there is a connection between 'sin' and 'sick-
ness', i.e., between how one deals with others and what hap-
pens to oneself [p. 229]."
Boisen (1936), a former psychotic patient, believes
many forms of psychosis to be the result of spiritual, or
religious, difficulties. The word "moral" could be used
as well in this context. From his first-hand experience and
observations, Boisen believes that "the primary evil... in
dementia praecox . . . lies in the realm of social relationships,
particularly in a life situation involving the sense of per-
sonal failure. We have found one characteristic common to
the group as a whole; they are isolated from their fellows
...[p. 28]." Having cited this connection between spiritual
conflict, interpersonal needs, and mental illness, Boisen
discusses the social nature of the religious need, and con-
cludes that "the basis of all psychotherapy is the removal
of the sense of isolation [p. 210]."
Mowrer (1961), as we have seen, also believes mental
illness is a "social and moral illness" (p. 91), and that
therapy must proceed along socio-moral lines. A problem
with his work is that his description of morality remains
at this general level, and his view of therapy calls for
restitutive actions on the part of the patient. Mowrer
admits to being out of his field of competence when discus-
sing morality. For many years psychology has been attempt-
ing to deal with this emotionally laden concept, and in
recent years has developed what appear to be adequate and
useful methods for this purpose. Accepting as a working
hypothesis that interpersonal life and the moral world are
closely related, and further accepting that this moral-
interpersonal area might be of considerable importance in
understanding human social behavior, particularly maladapt-
ive behavior, then we should examine closely the development
of the research area of morality to see if its present know-
ledge throws new light on old and puzzling problems.
Research
. Swainson (in Kay, 1968), a moral development
researcher, makes the connection between morality and the
interpersonal world using the work of Martin Buber as her
justification in doing so. In accord with Buber's belief
that the reality of existence is personal relations, Swain-
son concludes that morality emerges from relationships. As
Kay (1968) describes Swainson's system, "morality emerges
from the tension between self and society [p. 98]." The
tension is one between "a morality of being true to oneself
and the morality of relating to others [Kay, 1968, p. 98]."
The need for unity with others is an early physiological
survival pressure for the infant and child, and a later psy-
chological survival pressure for the adolescent and adult.
6Early, the needs for inclusion and affection become crucial,
with control needs becoming more important to the matured
and hopefully independent adult. To live in the world with
others, and still exist as a separate human being, necessi-
tates a dual-concern in actions and judgment: a concern for
one's independence and uniqueness, coupled with an equal
concern for one's connection with others and common humanity.
Moral development is a statement of a person's progress in
resolving this tension in his life, his success in living
with a world-view which recognizes a differentiated self, but
does not overlook the fact that existence is a social enter-
prise .
In his early moral judgment research, Sharp's (1898)
major contention was that "there exist different types of
moral judgment, which are represented with varying degrees
of completeness in different persons [p. 198]." This early
statement appears more insightful as Piaget's and Kohlberg's
work in this area is described below. Sharp's method of
measuring moral judgment was to provide his subjects with
ten hypothetical situations involving moral decisions, and
have them resolve the situations according to their own be-
liefs. This method is used in exactly the same fashion to-
day, some seventy years later, by Lawrence Kohlberg. Sharp's
"objective attitude" enabled him to refrain from labeling
some answers "more moral" than others, an emotional modera-
tion that many future morality researchers were unable to
7attain (see Pittel and Mendelsohn's (1966) critique of
moral value measurement).
With Plaget's writings (in Kay, 1968), the stage is set
for the sequential level development of moral judgment car-
ried on later by Kohlberg. According to Piaget, from a
morality based on restraint and rigid law, the child moves
to a morality of social experience, cooperation based upon
the intellectual faculty of reciprocal thinking, and finally
to a point of moral equity, a stage of autonomy of judgment.
Piaget' s complete four stages of moral development are, 1)
egocentric, 2) authoritarian, 3) reciprocity, and 4) equity.
Intellect, the capacity for reciprocal thinking, for putting
oneself in another's place, bridges stages two and three,
while a growing humanity or altruism takes the child to the
final stage of equity. Piaget offers reasons for changes
in moral judgment, one Deing the intellectual growth due to
maturation, the other two stressing interpersonal aspects:
increased dealings with peers as opposed to adults, and a
decrease in adult strictures and domination.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1968), who describes himself as
"inspired by Jean Piaget 's pioneering effort to apply a
structural approach to moral development [p. 25]," has
developed a schema for the development of moral thought. It
consists of three basic levels with two related stages within
each level. "These levels and stages may be considered
separate moral philosophies, distinct views of the socio-
8moral world [p. 25]." A person is placed in one of Kohl-
berg's stage-level combinations on the basis of his elabora-
tive responses to four moral conflict stories, the method
being markedly similar to Sharp's design. Both Sharp's and
Kohlberg's methods (i.e., having the subjects resolve moral
dilemmas) conform to Pittel and Mendelsohn's (1966) recom-
mendations for the measurement of moral values. The sub-
jects' attitudes are viewed as subjective phenomena, and are
not evaluated with respect to societal norms or preordained
visions of "moral" and "immoral." Sharp and Kohlberg evalu-
ate each individual's personal response to a moral situation
not in terms of normative or conventional values, but simply
as an expression of his own world-experience. The subject
does not merely answer questions as to right or wrong, to
which the tester has the correct moral choices. He describes
his own view of a morally conflictual situation.
Returning to the details of Kohlberg's theory, in the
preconventional or premoral level, the environment is more
important to the child than are actual human beings. This
is a very physical stage of development, with moral values
residing in external, physical events or in physical needs,
rather than in persons or standards. The "obedience and
punishment" orientation, a deference to the force rather
than the person of authority, characterizes the first stage
of this premoral level (Stage 1). The second stage has been
called "narcissistic," egocentric," or the stage of instru-
mental relativists" (Stage 2). Good behavior satisfies one's
own needs, and the only sense of reciprocity that exists is
again a physical, ego-centered one. Exchange exists, but as
Kohlberg says, "human relations are viewed in terms like
those of the marketplace [p. 26]." The orientation to reci-
procity is a very naive one, devoid of the principles of
justice or gratitude--" You scratch my back and I'll scratch
yours" (p. 26).
The conventional level of morality centers on performing
a "good" or "right" role, being the "good boy or girl."
Order, and the expectations of others, must be maintained.
The third stage of development is referred to as the personal
concordance stage (Stage 3). Here, the person performs ac-
tions which will please or help others, tries to fulfill a
"natural" role in society, and be seen as a "nice guy." The
maintenance of good relations is all-important. The next
stage within this conventional level emphasizes an orienta-
tion to authority, and can be called the "law and order"
stage (Stage 4). The social order is supreme, and its rules
are fixed and binding. One does "one's duty," and shows
respect for authority. In every society studied by Kohlberg,
Stage *J is the most frequent mode of moral judgment in adults
Concluding Kohlberg' s system, the third and highest
level is the postconventional or "principled" one, in which
"Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or
shareable standards, rights, or duties [Kohlberg, 1969, p.
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376].- Both stages in this level emphasize a mutuality in
life, concern for others' rights from a nonegotistic per-
spective. There is a genuine and flexible concern for the
social relations of life. The first stage is the social
contract orientation (Stage 5). Right action is based upon
consensus, or "standards which have been critically examined
and agreed upon by the whole society [Kohlberg, 1968, p. 26]."
Majority rule is the value, with laws or rules subject to
change if the society so wills it. As Kohlberg points out,
this stage sums up the spirit of our American Constitution.
The highest stage in Kohlberg' s scale is one of indi-
vidual principles (Stage 6). Abstract, ethical principles
originate which are universal and comprehensive, and these
supercede formal rules or laws. Mutual respect and justice
are emphasized, and the individual conscience is free and
creative. The personal principles Kohlberg (1968) lists are
"justice, reciprocity and equality of human rights, and
respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons
[p. 26]." The person runs a greater risk of violating group
norms or laws at this stage than at any other, even greater
than the risks of the premorally guided individual. Kohlberg
(1968) has found that his stages of moral development are
relevant in foreign cultures (Great Britain, Canada, Taiwan,
Mexico, and Turkey), since all of these societies have some
basic institutions—family, economy, law, government— that
permit role-taking opportunities.
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The similarities between Piaget and Kohlberg are evi-
dent. Kohlberg's preconventional has the flavor of Piaget 's
egocentric, Kohlberg's conventional, the spirit of Piaget »s
authoritarian, and Kohlberg's principled stages have their
parallels in the Piagetian stages of reciprocity and equity.
Another cognitive-developmental researcher, Loevinger (1966),
lists six stages of ego development that closely parallel
Kohlberg's moral hierarchy. Corresponding to Kohlberg's
Stages 1 through 6 are Loevinger 's Impulse-ridden, Opportun-
istic, Conformist, Conscientious, Autonomous, and Integrated
stages
.
Having briefly summarized the sequence of stages In
Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Loevinger's systems, it would be
helpful at this point to present some of the basic assumptions
underlying the theories of these cognitive-developmental
psychologists. Kohlberg states (1969) that
The cognitive-developmental assumption is that
basic mental structure is the result of an inter-
action between certain organismic structuring ten-
dencies and the structure of the outside world, rather
than reflecting either one directly. This interaction
leads to cognitive stages which represent the trans-
formations of simple early cognitive structures as
these are applied to (or assimilate) the external
world, and as they are accommodated to or restructured
by the external world in the course of being applied
to it. [p. 352]
These cognitive stages have four major characteristics
(Kohlberg, 1969):
1) Stages indicate distinct or qualitative differences
in modes of thinking.
2) These different modes of thinking form an invari-
ant stepwise sequence in individual development. The speed
of development may vary, but the sequence is immutable.
3) Each of these different and sequential modes of
thought forms a "structured whole." Responses are not tied
to a particular situation or task, but are evidence of an
underlying thought organization.
4) Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations,
i.e., each stage is a differentiation and integration of a
set of functional contents present at the prior stage. The
levels are abstract concepts, not age-specific stages, and
in the hierarchical model there is one characteristic, or
predominant, stage for each person. In the Kohlberg system,
it is thus common for mixed-type scores to occur. Here,
two stages of moral cognition are heavily employed in one
subject's responses—one of major importance and frequency,
the other representing a minor, but significant, percentage
of use. These mixed scores can represent transitional
points from stage to stage (e.g., 3(*0), or can be examples
or separate and distinct moral philosophies (e.g., 4(2)).
In all cases, the score not in the parentheses is the major
stage of moral judgment.
Dealing with another aspect of the developmental the-
ory, Kohlberg (1969a) discusses two types of regression to
lower stage usage that may occur. These are functional and
structural regressions. The functional regression (found by
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Haan, Smith, & Block (1968) to exist in some college activ-
ists) is the choice of modal usage of a premoral stage of
judgment with the retention of the earlier capacity to use
conventional and even postconventional thinking. In a
structural regression there is a lack of awareness of alter-
native of higher moral points of view, and this type of re-
gression has been found to exist in some schizophrenics,
criminals, and people over sixty-five (Kohlberg, 1969a).
Additionally, in discussing moral development, there is also
the possibility that a person may have failed to develop
beyond a premoral stage, and so the concept of regression
need not always be employed.
The major characteristics of cognitive stages are the
theoretical basis of Kohlberg' s six stages of moral judgment,
and they can be demonstrated by taking another look at the
stages in terms of the differing conceptions of reciprocity
in each stage (Kohlberg, 1969). From Stage l's reciprocity
of obedience and freedom from punishment, comes Stage 2's
literal exchange philosophy, followed by Stage 3's grati-
tude orientation and reciprocal maintenance of expectations,
Stage 4's work and conformity view of keeping one's word and
bargain, Stage 5's social contract between free and equal
individuals, and, finally, Stage 6's universal ethical prin-
ciples of reciprocal role-taking. The large distinction
between conventional and principled morality is significant.
Where the conventional moral thinker feels the social order
1*1
embodies the structures of reciprocity, the principled
thinker believes the social order itself is derived from
the principles of justice and principles of universalized
reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 398-399).
What Kohlberg means by morality is the way the individ-
ual structures his relations with others, the way he lives
and acts in society. Kohlberg' s conceptualizations are a
natural progression from the work of Buber and the inter-
personal theorists previously mentioned, only in Kohlberg's
they are tied to an empirical measure of cognitive develop-
ment. Kohlberg (1969) sounds strikingly similar to Buber
when he claims that
The direction of social or ego development is
also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between
the self's actions and those of others toward the
self ... social cognition always involves role-
taking, i.e., awareness that the other is in some
way like the self, and that the other knows or is
responsive to the self in a system of complementary
expectations, [p. 3^9]
Buber uses terms such as "inclusion" or "making-present" to
describe putting yourself in another's situation and exper-
iencing an encounter from his pole of the relationship. In
a more literary fashion, Buber supports Kohlberg 1 s view with
this description of role-taking:
This "making-present" increases until it is a
paradox in the soul when I and the other are em-
braced by a common living situation, and the pain
which I inflict upon him surges up in myself, re-
vealing the abyss of the contradictoriness of life
between man and man. [Buber, 1965, p. 103]
The stages or moral development actually represent the suc-
cessive shapes which the perfecting, refining, and tuning
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of this capacity for reciprocity take. To be able to exper-
ience honestly an interaction from the other person's per-
spective requires, at least, conventional moral judgment,
and this ability is absent in the premoral stages. Being
separate and alone in a world of others, being at once an
individual and a social creature, places certain demands on
the human being. Kohlberg (1969) calls this "the area of
the conflicting claims of selves... the area of morality, or
of moral conflict [p. 398]. M
Overview of the study
. The interpersonal world of the
emotionally disturbed has been described as limited and
isolated, their patterns of relating have been viewed as' in-
effectual, confused, or narcessistic , and their guilt over
personal experiences and failures has seemed self-destructive
in the light of their incapacity to change their way of life.
In more psychological language, they may be experiencing few
role-taking opportunities, leading lives which become more
and more private as the years slip by. And what is more,
they may be unable to make use of any new opportunities for
relation which may arise, since their way of viewing the
world may have ruled out certain types of experiences in their
lives. All of these descriptions and hypotheses are con-
gruent with the picture of the premoral individual's world
given in the Kohlberg Scale of Moral Development. The actual
exploration of the socio-moral world of the emotionally dis-
turbed is the basis for the following study. By administering
16
matched groups of mental patients
and of control medical patients, it was hoped to detect dif-
ferential trends in moral Judgment between the two popula-
tions
.
Within the mentally disturbed group, the social aliena-
tion and withdrawal of the schizophrenic, and the tense,
anxiety-dominated interpersonal world of the neurotic, would
lead one to predict a more primitive, or more premoral, ori-
entation in these groups than in a group of "normal" subjects
Morality develops as relational capacity develops, and sophis
ticated moral judgment cannot exist in an interpersonal void.
The descriptions of the existential death of the schizo-"
phrenic points to both an interpersonal and a moral failure.
If others are not perceived as real, how can their interests
figure heavily in the moral judgments of the schizophrenic?
Indeed, it could be hypothesized that proceeding from the
schizophrenic, to the neurotic, to the psychologically "nor-
mal" medical control patient, the socio-moral world defined
by Kohlberg's stages should increase from the premoral to
the conventional level. Moral judgment, intuitively, should
show the same relationship to these groups as does the quali-
ty of interpersonal life, increasing in effectiveness, mutu-
ality, and sophistication as one proceeds from the disturbed
to the more or less "normal" or adjusted. The importance of
this moral-interpersonal realm has been discussed above. The
knowledge of a person's cognitive stage of moral development
17
can have Implications for the overall understanding of
pathological states, and it may serve as a foundation for
effective psychotherapy.
This study is exploratory in nature, and can be viewed
as an initial attempt to apply the Kohlberg Moral Judgment
system to personality disorders. It is hoped that the rele-
vance of moral-interpersonal issues in understanding psycho-
logical disturbance may be established through the use of
the Kohlberg system.
I
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II. METHODOLOGY
Subjects. Sixty male veterans from the Kingsbridge
Veterans Administration Hospital, Bronx, New York, agreed
to participate in the study. The experimental group con-
sisted of thirty patients from the three psychiatric wards
of the hospital, and the control group consisted of thirty
patients from the medical wards of the same hospital. No
medical patient employed in the study had previously spent
time on a psychiatric ward. Medical patients were employed
as control Ss because they shared the general experience of
being hospitalized in a VA facility, and they came from
similar socio-economic groups. The educational level and
socio-economic status of both the experimental and control
groups were evaluated on the basis of the patient's state-
ment of education and occupation. The two groups were found
to be largely equivalent on these factors.
The criterion for the selection of the mental patient
group was simply hospitalization for emotional problems.
This group turned out, based on their most recent official
diagnosis, to consist of twenty schizophrenic and ten neu-
rotic patients. This diagnosis was determined at the pa-
tient's psychiatric interview following his admission to the
hospital. The varying types of schizophrenia and neurosis
noted in these thirty diagnoses seemed sufficiently vague
and unsubstantiated to warrant looking at the three groups
I19
in the study (medical controls, neurotics, and schizo-
phrenics) simply as roughly hewn points along a continuum
of increasing emotional disturbance. More detailed or
elaborate, explanations of results with regard to particular
etiologies of various forms of schizophrenia and neurosis
are beyond the scope of this study (and the present state of
classification of maladaptive behavior). The two major
groups (mental and medical) or thirty Ss each were matched,
insofar as possible, on age, religion, educational level,
socio-economic status, and number of hospitalizations.
Measures
.
The measure employed was Kohlberg's Moral
Judgment Interview, which contains four hypothetical moral
conflict stories and corresponding sets of probing questions
(see Appendix A). The method of scoring used was Kohlberg's
global rating system, where moral issues are scored within
each story, leading to a global moral stage score for each
story, and where, finally, the global stage scores of the
four stories are combined into one "global-global" stage
score for the individual S.
A subject might, for example, give Stage 3 responses
for most issues in a particular story (some typical moral
issues are Life, Role Relationships, Punishment, and Author-
ity), leading to a Stage 3 global score for the story. In
combining global scores from the four stories into one
global-global score, an overall modal stage is assigned if
50$ or more of the stories are at that stage. In deciding
20
on this percentage, a mixed score (e.g., 4( 5 )) ls weighted
1 for the minor code, which is in parentheses, and 2 for
the major code, which is out of parentheses. A pure score
(e.g., 5). is weighted 3. A minor global-global stage is
assigned if 25% or more of the weighted stories are at that
stage. A pure-type global-global score requires 15% or more
of the weighted stories to be at that stage.
As a concrete example, a subject might receive a global
score of 3 on Story I, a global score of 3(4) on Story III,
a global score of k on Story IV, and a global score of 3 on
Story VIII. Using the weighted scores, the following chart
can be constructed:
Moral Stages
12 3 4 5 6
Story I
Story III
Story IV
Story VIII
8 4
(67%) (33%)
This yields a global-global score of 3(*0, Stage 3 being the
modal stage of usage (above 50%), and Stage 4 being the
minor stage (above 25% of the stories are at this stage).
The experimenter scored all protocols without knowledge
of the subject's identity of group affiliation. The scoring
procedure was learned by the experimenter at a three-day
21
workshop conducted by Dr. Kohlberg and his associates at
Harvard University in June of 1970.
Procedure
.
The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview was
administered individually for all Ss in one session, usually
lasting one hour. Subjects were told that the study con-
cerned finding out how patients in the hospital felt about
certain issues. Each S was then told,
I will read some stories to you, and after each
story I shall ask you some questions about the story.
There are no right or wrong answers to these ques-
tions, different people have different opinions. Ijust want you to give your own ideas and opinions.
This is not a test, and no one in the hospital will
see any of your answers.
Some mental patients and some medical patients were unable
to or had no desire to respond to the Kohlberg stories, and
so the final sixty Ss are most likely a naturally selected
group of the more cooperative (or passive), more interper-
sonally comfortable patients initially approached on a ran-
dom basis. Interviews of medical and mental patients were
randomly distributed over the five weeks in which Ss were
run, so that no one group was seen at a particular point in
time. One difference in administering the interview to the
two groups was that the majority of mental patients were
able to come to an office to be interviewed, whereas the
majority of medical patients were confined to their beds and
had to be Interviewed on the ward.
22
III. RESULTS
Each S in this study received a Global-Global Moral
Judgment Score (see Methodology section) which consisted of
either a single modal stage of usage (e.g., 3) or a mixed-
type stage score (e.g., 3(2)). The weights assigned to the
components of the mixed score, according to Kohlberg's scor-
ing procedure, are two-thirds for the major stage of usage
(the stage not in parentheses), and one-third for the minor
stage (the stage in parentheses). The original Kohlberg
stage scores for the sixty Ss can be found in Table 1. For
statistical purposes, a single numerical score was desired,
and so a simple transformation of the Global-Global ratings
was performed, Using the weights described above, each
single stage score was multiplied by three (e.g., a Stage 3
score =3x3=9). The components of the mixed-type scores
were multiplied by their respective weights (e.g., a mixed-
type score of 3(2) = 2x3 plus 1x2 = 8). The scores possible
in this transformed system range from 3 (a Kohlberg score of
Stage 1) to 18 (a Kohlberg Stage 6).
Completely randomized one- and two-factor analyses of
variance were used throughout the data analysis, allowing
for simple and complex comparisons of moral judgment involv-
ing patient group, marital status, religion, age, and number
of hospitalizations. Because of the disproportionate fre-
quencies of the variables that are found in these patient
populations, the method of expected cell frequencies was
TABLE 1
Global-Global Moral Judgment Stage Scoresfor Mental and Medical Patients
Mental Patient Group
Subject No. Score
1 4(3)
2 3(2)
3 2(1)
4 3
5 2
6 3
7 3(4)
8 3
9 3(4)
10 2(4)
11 3
12 2(3)
13 3(5)
14 3
15 2
16 3
17 3(2)
18 4(3)
19 3(2)
20 4
21 4(3)
22 3
23 3(2)
24 4
25 2
26 3(2)
27 3(2)
28 4(2)
29 4(3)
30 4(3)
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21 4(3)
22 3
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25 4(5)
26 4
27 3
28 5(4)
29 4(3)
30 4(3)
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employed for the analyses (Myers, 1969, p. 109).
The first overall analysis compared the two major
patient groups in the study, the mental patient and medical
patient groups, to see if the hypothesized difference in
moral development would be borne out. The mean "moral devel-
opment" score (all scores discussed in this section will be
the transformed scores described above, ranging from 3 to 18)
for the thirty mental patients was 8.96, while the mean score
for the thirty medical patients was 10. 30. The results of
this analysis are presented in Table 2. The difference be-
tween mental and medical patients' moral judgment scores was
significant (£<£.01), medical control patients, as a group,
evidencing a clearly higher level of moral stage usage than
did the mental patient group.
Dividing the mental patient group into its two subgroups,
schizophrenics and neurotics, and comparing the moral judg-
ments now of the three groups in the study, the results showed
the twenty schizophrenic patients to have a mean score of 8.85,
the ten neurotic patients a mean score of 9.20, and, as cited
before, the thirty medical patients' mean score was 10. 30.
The analysis of the data, seen in Table 3, indicates that
there is a significant difference (p_<.05) between schizo-
phrenic, neurotic, and medical patients' levels of moral judg-
ment. A Newman-Keuls analysis was employed to examine the
nature of the differences between schizophrenic, neurotic,
and medical control patient mean moral judgment scores which
TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral JudgmentScores for Mental and Medical Patients
Source of Variance df MS
Patient Group (A) 1 26.7 8 53
S/A 58 3.13
*p_ < .01.
26
TABLE 3
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral Judgment Scoresfor Schizophrenic, Neurotic, and Medical Patients
Source of Variance df MS
Patient Group (A) 2 13.77
S/A 57 3.17
*R <.05.
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led to the significant overall P. The results of the Newman-
Keuls analysis (Table 4) indicate that the significant dif-
ference in the overall analysis of variance was accounted
for by the difference (.05 < E <.0 7 5) between schizophrenic
patient and medical control patient mean moral judgment
scores. The fact that the analysis of variance comparing
schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical patients' moral judg-
ment scores was significant at the .05 level, while the only
significant difference in the Newman-Keuls method was slightly
above that level may be explained by noting that the Newman-
Keuls is a less powerful test than is the analysis of variance
Along with the main effect of patient group, other per-
sonality variables might be interacting with moral judgment.
Marital status is one such variable. Due to the naturally
occurring frequencies of this variable in these patient groups
it was not matched across patient populations. Contrasting
first the combined effects of marital status (single as op-
posed to married, separated, or divorced), and patient group
(mental or medical), Table 5 provides the basic information
of sample size and group moral judgment score means. There
is an increase of approximately one point across both vari-
ables, either proceeding from single to married individuals
within a patient group, or proceeding from mental to medical
patient status at either level of the marriage variable. The
mental patient group's moral judgment scores were lower than
the medical patient group's by approximately one point in
28
TABLE 4
i
Newman-Keuls Analysis of Difference in Moral JudgmentScores for Schizophrenic, Neurotic,
and Medical Patients
Schizophrenic
8.85
Neurotic
9.20
Medical
10.30
Schizophrenic 8.85
Neurotic 9.20
.35 1.45
1.10
Medical 10. 30
*.05 <p_ < . 075.
Schizophrenic Neurotic Medical
Note.—Treatments underlined by a common line do not differ
from each other; treatments not underlined by a common line
do differ.
TABLE 5
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size(in Parentheses) for Single Mental Patients
Married Mental Patients, Single Medical
'
Patients, and Married Medical Patients
Mental Medical
Single
Married
~-
—
-
1 —. 1—
,
X = 8.46
(N = 15)
X = 9.5
(N = 8)
X = 9.46
(N = 15)
X = 10.59
(N = 22)
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both marital conaitions. Indeed, a single medical patient's
score was slightly higher than a married mental patient's.
The analysis of these results, Table 6, indicates that the
main effect of the difference between mental and medical
patients was again significant (p_<.05), and also shows that
the main effect of the difference between single and married
patients was significant (p_<.05) as well, married individuals
showing a higher stage of moral development. No interaction
effect was apparent. If instead of two patient groups (men-
tal and medical), this population is divided into three groups
(schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical—see sample sizes and
group means in Table 7), and the same two-factor analysis of
variance is run, the results, as shown in Table 8, evidence
the same significant difference (p_<.05) between single and
married patients across the three groups. The main effect
for the differences between the three patient groups was re-
duced to slightly above the .05 level as a result of this
breakdown of the patient group variable from two to three
groups. Again, there was no significant interaction effect
present
.
In a study of moral judgment the variable of religion
is certainly of interest, and it was explored in this research
Ss stated their own religious affiliation, with four Ss ex-
pressing no affiliation and therefore being eliminated from
this analysis. It was impossible to divide the patient groups
into two subgroups because of the extremely small sample size
31
TABLE 6
Anal
rni%? f Yariance Comparison of Moral Judgment Scoresfor Single and Married Mental and Medical Patients
Source of Variance df MS p
Patient Group (A) i l8<1 6 ^
Marital Status (B) 1 l4>2 ^ g#
AB loo1 3.3 1.11
S/AB 56 2>9?
*p_ < .05
TABLE 7
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size
< in Parentheses) for Single and MarriedSchizophrenic, Neurotic, and Medical Patients
Schizophrenic Neurotic Medical
Single
X = 8.20 X = 9
1
X = 9.5
(N = 10) (N = 5) (N = 8)
Married
X = 9.5 X = 9.4 X = 10.59
(N = 10) (N = 5) (N = 22)
—
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral JuoVmentScores for Single and Married Schizophrenic
Neurotic, and Medical Patients
Source of Variance
AB
df MS
Patient Group (A) 2 9.1 2.99
Marital Status (B) 1 15>5
S/AB 5 4 3>o4
5.09
2 .66
.22
*p_ < .05
3^
of some of the resulting cells in this analysis. Mean
scores and sample sizes for combinations of patient group
and religious affiliation (Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish)
are found in Table 9. The analysis of these data, seen in
Table 10, shows a significant main effect differentiating
the two patient groups once again (p_<.05), shows no signi-
ficant main effect differentiating the various religious
affiliations, but does show a significant interaction be-
tween patient group and religious affiliation (p_<.01). A
graph of this interaction, along with a Newman-Keuls analysis
to discover the sources of significance in the interaction
effect, are shown in Figure 1 and Table 11, respectively.
The significant difference in the overall interaction effect
lies in the difference between Jewish mental and Jewish medi-
cal patients (p_<.05). Of the six cells in this analysis,
the mean score of Jewish mental patients is the lowest (8.36),
while the mean score of Jewish medical patients is the high-
est (11.20). This single difference among cells accounted
for the significant interaction effect found in this analysis.
The sample sizes of these two groups (Jewish mental patients
= 8, Jewish medical patients = 5) were quite small, however,
so that this difference, while statistically reliable, is not
a clearly established one.
Another variable of interest in discussing the develop-
ment of moral judgment is the age of the S s . Table 12 pre-
sents the sample sizes and mean moral judgment scores for
35
TABLE 9
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size(in Parentheses) for Catholic, Protestant,
and Jewish Mental and Medical Patients
Mental Medical
Catholic
• •
X = 8.72 X = 10. 41
(N = HI) (N = 17)
Protestant
X = 10.17 X = 9.50
(N 6
)
(N 6)
Jewish
X = 8.38 X = 11.20
(N = 8) (N -= 5)
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TABLE 10
scores for Catholic, Protestant, andJewish Mental and Medical Patients
Source of Variance
Patient Group (A)
Religion (B)
AB
S/AB
*p_ C .05.
**p_< .01.
df MS F
1 20.9 6.61*
2
.6
.2
2 17.3 5.^7**
50 3.16
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TABLE 12
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size(in Parentheses) for Mental and Medical PatientsUnder Forty and Over Forty Years of Age
Mental Medical
Under Forty
Over Forty
—
-
X = 9.0
(N = 16)
i
X = 10
(N = 12)
X = 8.93
(N = 14)
X = 10.5
(N = 18)
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mental and medical patients under and over forty years of
age. The analysis of the data on age in Table 13 shows the
expected significant (p_<.01) main effect for patient group
(medical patients having higher moral judgment scores than
mental patients), but shows no significant main effect for
age, and no significant interaction effect between age and
patient group. Because sample size permitted it, in this
case the patient group variable was divided into three
groups (schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical patients), and
Table lk presents the sample sizes and mean scores for these
groups' combinations with the two levels of the age variable.
The analysis of the data appears in Table 15, and even with
this additional patient group breakdown, the main effect for
the differences between moral judgments of patient groups
was again significant (p_<.05), but age as a variable and
the interaction of age and patient group were not significant.
One final variable of considerable importance in any
hospital-based study is the number of hospitalizations exper-
ienced by each S. While the Kingsbridge VA Hospital is a
relatively short-term hospital, a division of patients into
those having under four and those having four or more hos-
pitalizations was possible. The sample sizes and mean scores
for mental and medical patients in these groups are given in
Table 16. A further division of the patients into schizo-
phrenic, neurotic, and medical groups was not possible with
the variable of number of hospitalizations due to the fact
Hi
TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral JudgmentScores for Mental and Medical Patients
Under and Over Forty Years of Age
Source of Variance
Patient Group (A)
Age (B)
AB
S/AB
df MS P
1 25.51 7.97*
1
.07
.02
1 2.14
.67
56 3.20
*p_ < .01.
TABLE 1H
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size(in Parentheses) for Schizophrenic, Neurotic
and Medical Patients Under Forty
and Over Forty Years of Age
Schizophrenic Neurotic Medical
Under Forty
X = 8.85 X = 9.67 X 10
(N - 13) (N = 3) (N = 12)
Over Forty
X = 8.86 X = 9.0 X = 10.5
(N - 7) (N - 7) (N = 18)
^3
TABLE 15
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral Judgment
pTi
T7 f^^P^enic, Neurotic, and MedicalPatients Under and Over Forty Years of Age
Source of Variance
Patient Group (A)
Age (B)
AB
S/AB
df MS F
2 12.58 3.82*
1
.29
.09
2 1.35
.41
54 3.29
*p_ < .05
TABLE 16
!
Group Moral Judgment Score Means and Sample Size
wifh ?
Se3) f°r Mental and Medlcal Patientst Under Four and Four or More Hospitalizations
Under Four
Four or More
Mental
X = 9.16
(N = 25)
X = 8.0
(N = 5)
Medical
X = 10.32
(N = 25)
X = 10.2
(N = 5)
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that no neurotic patient had more than three hospitaliza-
tions. Only ten patients out of the entire sample of sixty
Ss had four or more hospitalizations, and all five of the
mental patients with four or more hospitalizations were
schizophrenics. An analysis of the data on the number of
hospitalizations (Table 17) .indicates a significant (p_<.01)
main effect for patient group, but shows no significant main
effect for number of hospitalizations, and no significant
interaction between patient group and number of hospitaliza-
tions .
The appearance in several of the analyses of variance of
F ratios less than unity raises the possibility that the-
model underlying the analysis has been violated in some man-
ner. Since one experimenter interviewed all S s , some subtle
systematic interaction effect might have been present, or
perhaps some unknown source of variability entered into the
analysis. Definitive answers to these suppositions are not
available, but the frequency and size of the "under-one" F
ratios are net so striking as to challenge the use of this
method with the present data.
A story-by-story inspection of percentage of stage
usage (in this case, the original Kohlberg Stages 1-6) by
schizophrenic, neurotic, and medical patients (see Figures
2-5) shows differences between the groups as well as differ-
ences between general responses to the four individual stor-
ies. The schizophrenic group used a higher average percent-
46
TABLE 17
Analysis of Variance Comparison of Moral JudrmentScores for Mental and Medical Patients withUnder Four and Pour or More Hospitalizations
Source of Variance df MS F
Patient Group (A) 1 26.66 8.49*
Number of Hospitalizations (B) 1 3.41 1.09
AB
1 2.26
.72
S/AB 56 3.14
p_ < .01 .
< PERCENT \)SW=- OF S T/»*£
hi
o
r*
I
3
3
5
_I
3
kj o S»
?!
>i m
I *
I s
I
§
5 lll^SS
fhceur UsA&e OF S
48
nx
1
2
3,
0\
3
J 1 ! J
\^s\\\\A\^3
3
S3
mo j
"»3
1 <^
i s
O
1 ^
i
I
PERCENT IfcftfrC 0F ^ T/15£
50
1
hi
ft
^ rn
5 *s
si
• SI J
51
age of Stage 2 responses over the four stories {21%) than
did either the neurotic (15*) or the medical (Q%) groups.
Additionally, schizophrenic patients employed more Stage H
thinking (again, an average of the usage in the four stories),
30*, than did the neurotic group (20%). The medical patient
group, however, showed the highest average percentage of
Stage k thinking (24*) of all three patient groups. The
neurotic patient group, on the other hand, was the highest
average percentage user of Stage 3 thinking (53%) , followed
by the medical patients (45*), and the schizophrenic group
(40*). Stage 5 thinking was not heavily used, accounting for
10* of normal subject usage, 11* of neurotic patient usage,
and only 1% of schizophrenic usage. Looking at combined
group responses to the four stories, for Situations I, III,
and VIII, Stage 3 is clearly the most frequently used form of
moral judgment. The exception is Situation IV, which drew a
predominately (44*) Stage 4 response from the fifty-nine Ss
who were given this story. (See Figures 6-9.)
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IV. DISCUSSION
A new approach to psychopathology research
. In other
sections of this thesis an attempt was made to conceptually
tie together the areas of morality, interpersonal life, and
emotional disorders. One problem the interpersonal-
existential view of mental illness has faced in the past has
been the challenges from psychologists of different theoreti-
cal persuasions that the above-mentioned connections are
flimsy, literary, ivory-tower speculations. The work of
Kohlberg in creating a system, a measure, and a scale of
moral development may help to provide some answer to critics
of the humanistic approach to mental illness.
Kohlberg 1 s contention that morality consists of the way
the individual structures his relations with others, his
emphasis on the necessity of role-taking opportunities for
the development of reciprocity and mutuality, can lead to
hypotheses about the emotionally disturbed. Combining the
new information on moral development with already existing
interpersonal theories may make possible a broader picture
of the world of the mentally ill. This study represents an
exploration of the possible relevance of the Kohlberg measure
to emotional disturbance, and some comments relating to the
practical aspects of employing the Kohlberg system may be of
help to future psy chopathology researchers.
First, the interview in which the moral conflict stories
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and their probe questions were presented was found to be an
excellent format for interacting with both mental patients
and normal control subjects. The method is flexible enough
to allow for additional probing of any key areas, it can
withstand several interruptions in administration to accom-
modate anxious patients, and, most importantly, it has as
its basis the relationship between interviewer and respondent
The Kohlberg interview can be seen as a structured clinical
interview, since no test is actually being taken, all the
patient's responses are verbal, and a degree of rapport can
be established in the situation. The interviewer, in an
intuitive sense, learns more about the patient than his
Kohlberg stage of moral judgment after spending an hour with
him in discussion of the conflict stories. This additionally
informative aspect of the interview can be of especial im-
portance in the hospital setting, where knowing the patient
should be a goal along with the acquisition of research in-
formation.
While the Kohlberg system does make the concept of
morality researchable
, and does provide a framework in which
interpersonal life and mental illness can be included, it
does present some practical problems for the researcher.
First, scoring is complicated, requiring careful analysis of
all the subject's responses. Training by Kohlberg and his
assistants at their yearly workshop is a necessity at this
point in time. Kohlberg's scoring manual, as of this date,
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is still sketchy, and it is liable to leave the scorer
basing a number of judgments on his intuitive feel for the
stage system. Even with a detailed scoring manual, it would
still be crucial to learn and understand Kohlberg's system
before attempting to score protocols. This is not a test
with a key for scoring, and theoretical knowledge is indis-
pensable to the competent scorer. So the demands on the
future scorer for training, theoretical understanding, and
time for scoring itself, are large for the Kohlberg measure.
The benefits, however, include the use of a measure that
allows the subject to define his own socio-moral world a
measure supported by substantial research and validation.
It is to be hoped that researchers in the fields of inter-
personal relations and psychopathology will attempt to em-
ploy this measure, and keep pace with the new findings of
Kohlberg and others in the presently fast-evolving field of
moral development research.
Schizophrenic, neurotic, and normal moral Judgment . In
this study, the Kohlberg system was employed in an attempt
to understand the nature of the socio-moral world of the
schizophrenic, neurotic, and "normal" individual. The find-
ing of the greatest general significance in this study is
that the socio-moral world of the schizophrenic is different
from that of the "normal" individual. It is a more primitive,
withdrawn, non-mutual mode of experiencing the world, a more
extreme instance of a failure of relation than is found in
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a "normal" individual's moral Judgments. Most striking is
the schizophrenic group's reliance on Stage 2 Instrumental
Relativist thinking, which comprised approximately T(% of
their overall stage usage. A more vivid and complete sketch
of the premoral approach of schizophrenics can possibly be
obtained by a further description of the quality of Stage 2
thinking. Several theoretical formulations of the schizo-
phrenic experience may also be helpful at this point.
Of particular importance from the perspective of the
present study is the work of Macnab (1965), a clinician-
theologian who takes an existential look at the nature of
schizophrenia. Macnab stresses the significance of Buber's
insights in conceptualizing the interpersonal experience of
the schizophrenic:
In the person suffering from this condition
(schizophrenia) we may see varying degrees of
negation and distortion of all that is implied
in Buber's community, dialogue, and I -Thou.
Relation is diminished and reciprocity virtually
lost. The It tends to predominate in its talking-
about, manipulating, observing, and experiencing
the other without entering a relation. Meaning
and significance of life either are absent or
undergo distortions involving the categories of
time, space, causality, and substance, [p. 151]
A look at the characteristic judgments of the Stage 2
moral thinker clearly indicates an I-It type of existence.
The capacity for reciprocity exists only in an exchange or
revenge sense, as there is little ability ot understand the
other's feelings in a situation. All actions revolve around
the self, and others are used for self-gratification or
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as
personal survival needs. Indeed, others are experienced
"things" or "objects" in a solipsistically defined world.
For the schizophrenic, "turning toward the world" and
"entering into relation" with others are extremely problem-
atic areas, with the individual often resorting to taking
the whole world inside himself to avoid this tension and the
call to responsibility. This is expressed quite well in
Stage 2 moral thinking, where the self is the sole locus of
importance in the world. All exchange is literal in nature,
with a definite payoff in store for the self. In this stage,
other people exist, but they are not perceived as feeling,
needing, or loving persons. Thus, a pure Stage 2 thinker
might (in response to a Kohlberg moral dilemma) say he would
steal a drug to save his wife's life, but only because she
was a good cook and he liked to eat. Clearly, in Buber's
terms, no Thou is present, the Stage 2 thinker is "intimate"
or "real" with no one. The world outside the self becomes
increasingly objectified until the only source of life is the
self, and the internal world becomes raised to cosmic levels.
The crisis experienced by the schizophrenic can be
viewed, then, as a moral-interpersonal crisis, a lack of re-
lational capacity and mutuality. Mowrer (1961) believes
"...that in neurosis and psychosis the afflicted individual
is in a moral and spiritual crisis... [p. 79]," and Boisen
(1936) adds that "...religious concern and religious con-
sciousness tend to appear whenever men are facing the issues
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of life and are seeking to become better. Whenever this
involves severe conflict pathological features are likely
also to appear [p. 82]." While similar moral crises occur
in some degree at some point in the lives of most individuals,
for neurotics, and particularly for psychotics, a smooth,
"natural" adjustment or resolution does not occur. The
crisis, at this stage, serves not to facilitate development,
but to color, characterize, and control the whole of life
itself. In this broader context, Kohlberg (1969a) comments
that "the crisis and turning points of adult identity are
often moral. Prom St. Paul to Tolstoy, the classic auto-
biographies tell us the dramas of maturity are the transfor-
mations of the moral ideologies of men [p. 95]." Mental ill-
ness may be such a crisis, and can be such a turning point,
but too often it becomes a way of life, leaving the individ-
ual to create an existence out of his failure to make a
choice, his failure to develop. The work of Boisen (1936)
on successful and unsuccessful (or pathological) religious
conversions, and Laing's (1967) view of the "voyage" of the
mad are relevant here. As Laing (1967) says, "Madness need
not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough. It is
potentially liberation and renewal as well as enslavement
and existential death [pp. 133-13^]." In moral terms, crises
can cause us to grow, to mature in our relations with others,
or they can cause us to run from others, from responsibility
and from adulthood, and leave us concerned only with our-
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selves. The heavily premoral Stage 2 world of the schizo-
phrenic described in this study can be understood as repre-
senting the less adaptive reaction to the crisis. The un-
happiness associated with this state, the experiencing of
the failure of relation, the yearning for the Thou, cannot
be avoided, it would seem, unless a withdrawal from the
world is made complete. In these instances, it is just this
"human" quality of the regressed mental patient that obser-
vers note as being glaringly absent. In most less severe
cases, the crisis rages on, for it still has not been con-
fronted directly and worked through.
For the neurotic individual, moral judgment was found
to be not significantly different from the levels of judg-
ment of either schizophrenic or normal persons. The neu-
rotics' moral scores are slightly higher than the schizo-
phrenics', and are a good deal lower than the normal sub-
jects'. The ten neurotic individuals in the present study
appear to represent a middle ground of moral development
between the two extremes of psychotic and normal. Some
basic differences between all three of the above groups are
revealed, however, in a consideration of their differential
usage of the various moral stages.
The schizophrenic patient employs the greatest average
percentage of Stage 2 thinking (27%), followed by the neurotic
patient (15%) and the normal patient (Q%) . The neurotic
patient uses the highest percentage of Stage 3 thinking (53%) ,
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followed by the normal group {k 5%)
t
and the schlzophrenic
group (40$). And In Stage 4 usage, the normal group leads
with an average percentage of 3U* f followed by the schizo-
phrenic group (30$), and the neurotic group (20*). Stage 5
thinking was sparingly employed, with normal and neurotic
patients using approximately the same average percentage
(10% and 11$, respectively), and schizophrenics barely in-
dicating any use (1%)
.
These percentages of stage usage provide some additional
information to be used along with the contrasting of mean
scores of the three groups in the study. The neurotic pa-
tient's moral judgment consists mainly of conventional (and
a small percentage of post conventional ) modes of thought,
particularly the Stage 3 conception of the "good boy" role,
of maintaining societal expectations. While the schizo-
phrenic patient also uses a good deal of Stage 3 thinking,
he also relies on an extremely high percentage of Stage 2
usage and is virtually devoid of Stage 5 thinking.
The similarity between the mean scores of schizophre-
nic and neurotic patients seems to be due in part to the
schizophrenic's high amount of Stage 4 usage, second only
to normal group usage. It is Kohlberg's (1969a) contention
that normal adult moral development consists of the
dropping out of childish modes of thought rather
than the formation of new and higher modes of
thought ... the major change in moral though past
high school is a significant increase or stabiliza-
tion of conventional morality of a Stage 4 variety,
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at the expense of preconventional stages ofthought Much adult moral stabilization seemsto be not development but socialization or in-ternalization of the conventional code? [pp. 106-108]
This is Just what appears to be lacking in the schizophrenic
patient, despite his high Stage 4 usage. The childish, pre-
moral Stage 2 mode of thinking is still important to this
individual, and while conventional stages of judgment are
employed, there is no stabilization or consistency around
one stage, or even one level, of moral judgment. The range
of high-percentage stage usage for neurotic patients centers
around Stage 3 thinking, with relatively small amounts of
Stage 2 and Stage H thought being employed. For normal pa-
tients, Stage 3 is again the predominant stage, there is
almost no use made of Stage 2, and Stage 4 is drawing closer
to becoming the major stage. For the schizophrenic patient,
however, the range of stages includes Stage 2, Stage 3, and
Stage 4, with Stage 2 and Stage 4 almost identical in per-
centage of use.
The normal group, then, appears to represent the devel-
opment of moral judgment along the lines described above by
Kohlberg. Normal individuals show a stable usage of conven-
tional judgments, with Stage H drawing, close to the simpler
Stage 3 as the modal stage of use. The neurotic individual
centers his judgments almost exclusively in Stage 3 concep-
tions, showing few signs of progression to the more highly
developed Stage k concepts. The neurotics' judgments are
largely conventional, but somewhat naive, based less on
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societal norms, rules, or standards, than on hoping to fill
a natural or "good" role in society.
Conventional moral Judgments imply the ability to live
in the real world with others, the ability to take the role
of another. It is this capacity, present in normal and neu-
rotic individuals, that is diluted in schizophrenic moral
judgment. By using a high percentage of Stage 2 responses,
the schizophrenic is autistically coloring his moral Judgments
He may live and interact with other people, but his unstable
basis of moral judgment provides for an easy regression to
the physical, literal exchange philosophy of Stage 2. There
is a quality of blind, frightened self-preservation in Stage
2 thinking, a "looking out for Number One." For the schizo-
phrenic, in times of stress of conflict, conventional modes
of judgment may be replaced by the simpler, less demanding,
more purely defensive moral stance of the Stage 2 thinker.
The high percentage of Stage k among schizophrenic persons
indicates their ability to employ conventional moral judgment,
but there is little stabilization at one stage or one level,
little natural progression from stage to stage. The schizo-
phrenic can be seen as experimenting with a variety of ways
of living with others. Consistency and stability are what
is lacking; the faith in the social world necessary for a
relinquishing of premoral self-oriented concepts has not yet
been established. The schizophrenic patients interviewed in
this study were those patients who were able to relate in
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some decree to another person, who were in fairly good con-
tact with the real world. The more regressed, withdrawn,
and acutely disturbed schizophrenic, it is hypothesized,
would have presented an even stronger premoral aspect.
The predicament of mental patients, particularly
schizophrenics, in regard to moral development becomes
clearer if we note, once again, the growth-medium of moral-
ity:
If moral development is fundamentally a processOf the restructuring of modes of role-taking, thenthe fundamental social inputs stimulating moraldevelopment may be termed 'role-taking opportunities'
....The more the social stimulation, the faster the
p
ln°ral dovol °Pme"t. [Kohlberg, 1969, p. 399,
Social stimulation, "role-taking opportunities," are what
the schizophrenic lacks in his largely isolated and private
world. A point that is discussed in more detail below is
that many forms of psychotherapy have as their goal greater
social, or interpersonal, contact for the patient, and this
stress on living with others may be aiding the development
of moral judgment. The therapist himself provides role-
taking opportunities for the patient, and he may try to
make these mutual experiences more possjble for the patient
in the world outside the therapist's office. This increased
social stimulation may be responsible for a consequent in-
crease in level of moral judgment on the part of the patient
The re lation of other variables to mora l judgment . In
regard to role-taking, marriage would appear to be an
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extremely powerful social experience that could provide an
opportunity to aid moral development. The closeness and
mutuality that are possible in marriage, the opportunities
for confirmation of each partner by the other, make it
likely that this relationship would be a reciprocal one,
each partner experiencing the effect of his actions on the
other. The results of the present study do indicate that
marriage is strongly related to the stage of moral Judgment
reached. Married people, mental and medical patients alike,
tend to show a higher level of moral cognition than do their
single counterparts. The effect of pathology, however, is
equally significant, and so while married mental patients
might possess a higher level of judgment than do single
mental patients, both these groups are at a lower level than
either single or married normal individuals. It is inter-
esting that, in the hospital studied, the number of married
mental patients is far smaller than the number of married
medical patients. It may be that many mental patients have
not been able to meet the interpersonal demands inherent in
marriage. They remain single, thereby missing another op-
portunity for moral growth, and increasing the vicious cir-
cle of isolation leading relentlessly to ever-greater isola-
tion .
In discussing interpersonal life and morality, the
area of religion easily comes to mind. Both Mowrer (1961)
and London (1964) point to religion as once having offered
68
people a sense of community, but both these psychologists
now feel that religions have failed in this endeavor.
London (1964) goes so far as to say that psychology, or
science, will take the place of religion, noting "the
clergy have tended to abdicate their claim to moral compe-
tence in favor of psychology, and the congregations have,
by and large, resigned from their clergy [p. 172]." The
current popular obsession with encounter and sensitivity
groups, and the various youth movements (communes, Wood-
stock) seem to indicate that people are feeling a lack of
and a desire for community. Many people do not feel that
the conventional religions presently offer any relief from
alienation or any hope for the future. Indeed, Mowrer's
(1968) group therapy is a secular substitute for the old-
time religious communities, where secrets and problems were
shared not just with a confessor, but with the whole congre-
gation. As a result, the individual felt loved and respected
by the group. Perhaps Buber (1958) makes this substitution
of a psychology of interpersonal life for religious doctrine
more understandable in his discussion of the Eternal Thou.
Every Thou in the real world is destined to become an It at
some point in time, but God is the Thou who never becomes
objectified, He is the Eternal Thou, he can only be met
through the real I-Thou experiences of this world, each re-
lation with a real Thou offering us a glimpse of the Eternal
Thou. For Buber, then, the world becomes the temple, and
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prayer, doctrine, and formal worship are only distractions
from the task of living with others. This would seem to be
a suitable basis for much of the current emphasis in psycho-
therapy on interpersonal relations (e.g., Mowrer, Laing,
Boss, Trtib).
All this is in preface to the expectation that formal
religious affiliation would not seem to play that important
a role in determining levels of moral judgment. In the pre-
sent study, that proved to be the case. Whether this is be-
cause the religions themselves are defunct, or because the
members are insincere and do not truly live up to the reli-
gious precepts, is an unanswered question. No measure was
used to judge the seriousness of commitment to the religion,
or the nature of that commitment. The only criterion for
selecting the religious groups in this study was the pa-
tient's statement of affiliation. Most importantly, no con-
trol groups consisting of either atheists or individuals
with personal (nontraditional ) religious beliefs were em-
ployed. All that can be said at this point is that the
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups did not differ sig-
nificantly in moral judgment. The basis for the significant
difference between mental and medical Jewish patients (medi-
cal Jewish patients being higher in moral judgment) is un-
clear at this point due to small sample size and poor cri-
teria of religiosity.
The variable of age considered in this study also did
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not seem to have any relation to moral judgments. Since
all subjects were over twenty years of age, and most were
over thirty years old, this is not too surprising. Differ-
ences in moral judgment in adulthood, as we have seen,
center around stabilization of judgments, which depends not
on the age of the adult, but on the quality and nature of
his interpersonal and societal experiences.
A final point to note in reference to the results of
the present study is the finding that the number of hospital
izations for a patient was unrelated to his level of moral
judgment. It should be made clear that the hospital used is
a short-term mental hospital, and so only five out of thirty
mental patients had four or more hospitalizations. In a
longer-term hospital, the trend may have been different, and
certainly the sample size of the many-hospitalization group
would have been more substantial. In multiple, or lengthy,
hospitalizations, due to a prolonged experience of I-It
dealings with others, there could be a severe atrophying of
moral judgment. These long-term patients might fit in well
with the institution's workings and routines, but they can
be seen as cogs in the machine, objects, "burned-out cases,"
and their moral judgments should be similarly regressive.
Moral development and psychotherapy . The logical
question that should follow after a description of schizo-
phrenic and neurotic stages of moral development is "What
use can you make of this information?" The question that
will be dealt with here is the more specific
, "What are the
implications of this and other moral development research
for psychotherapy?"
At one level, the allowance for, and general encourage-
ment of, relatedness and mutuality in therapy is of some
benefit to the patient in a moral sense. It offers him a
chance to be real with one other Individual, to be exposed
to another's moral judgments and principles. This raises
the issue of the therapist as a "values change agent,"
bringing the patient more into contact with a conventional
way of life, a way approved by society. London (1964) claims
that this is an inevitable aspect of the therapeutic arrange-
ment, that "the manipulative character of psychotherapy can
no longer be in serious doubt either logically or empiri-
cally... [p. 1573." He finds no ethical conflict in this
fact, believing
The therapist's scientific job, from any view-
point, begins with his gaining information that he
can then use to manipulate, direct, or channel be-
havior, whether the behavior In question is the
discovery of hidden motives, a change in habits,
or a realignment with society, [p. 158]
Rosenthal (1955) found that neurotic patients who improved
in individual therapy "tended to revise certain of their
moral values in the direction of their therapists', while
the moral values of the patients who were unimproved tended
to become less like their therapists' [p. ^35]." Rosenthal's
study, however, dealt with moral attitudes, not cognitively
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defined modes of Judgment. These moral opinions seemed
largely based on socio-economic class standards as to what
is right or wrong, good or bad. The extremely small sample
size of the study (12) makes its results merely suggestive.
One difference between Kohlberg's stages of develop-
ment and the moral attitudes and standards mentioned above,
is that the Kohlberg stages are content- free . That is a
person could respond in two apparently opposite ways to a
conflict story and still manifest the same stage thinking.
Kohlberg deals with the structure of moral thought, not the
content of responses or surface attitudes. To call the
therapist a moral change agent could mean only that he puts
pressure on the patient to mouth conventional ethical be-
liefs. If this is the case, the structure of the patient's
thinking, the actual nature of his socio-moral world remains
unknown, and the effect the therapist has on the area of
moral cognition is unclear. London (1964) calls for the
therapist to employ scientific knowledge in his role as
change-agent, anu it may be possible for Kohlberg's research
to be used as a basis for a view of the therapist as "moral
development" agent, in a carefully defined sense.
An example of the difficulties a therapist can get into
if he deals only with surface attitudes and opinions in his
therapy, and if he is unaware of the stage of moral thinking
his patient is employing, is given in this statement by
Kohlberg (1969) !
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The problem posed by stage theory is that thestimulus inputs received by the child are usuallyeither assimilated to his own level or are not per-ceived as stimuli at all. As an example, a StageTwo delinquent is offered 'role-taking opportunities'by an understanding psychotherapist, but these op-portunities are perceived as opportunities to 'con asucker' and do not stimulate development beyondStage Two [p. 402] *
This example points to the value of viewing moral judgment
as an important issue in therapy, for whatever the value
system or therapeutic goals the clinican might possess, his
effectiveness could be improved by a knowledge of what cog-
nitive abilities the patient has in responding to his treat-
ment. This seems especially true for the schizophrenic pa-
tient, as he lacks some of the cognitive skills necessary
for conventional moral judgment and reciprocal role-taking.
The therapist may be able to proceed more efficiently by
structuring his treatment to the socio-moral world of the
patient
.
How can the knowledge of the patient's stage of moral
development be used to any benefit by the therapist? First,
in a general sense, Kohlberg (1969a) writes "Moral develop-
ment involves a continual process of matching a moral view
to one's experience of life in a social world. Experiences
of conflict in this process generate movement from structural
stage to structural stage... [p. 118]." In dealing with pa-
tients who show a difficulty in moving developmentally from
stage to stage, carefully structured discussions of abstract
or hypothetical situations may help the patient to deal with
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his cognitive conflicts in a more direct and successful
fashion. Either a fixation at or regression to a premoral
stage, or a confused scattering of judgments across levels
can be possibly alleviated by a clear focussing of atten-
tion on the moral judgment area. The therapist could dis-
cuss moral conflict stories with the patient, and could pre-
sent various alternative ways of looking at a moral choice
situation (not necessarily views which are characteristic
of the therapist's own stage of judgment). In an atmosphere
of a free exchange of views, the patient can be aided in
reorganizing his problematic and unstable moral judgments by
exposure to other opinions and resolutions of moral-inter-
personal conflicts. A natural development of the patient's
mode of moral thinking may result from this educational ex-
perience
.
Dealing with the technical aspects of moral education,
Kohlberg (1969) writes
The problem of moral change would appear to be
one of presenting stimuli which are both suffi-
ciently incongruous as to stimulate conflict in
the child's existing stage schemata and sufficiently
congruous as to be assimilable with some accommo-
dative effort ... .With regard to the assimilation of
moral judgments made by others, the 'match' notions
just presented suggest that there would be maximal
assimilation of moral judgments one level above the
S's own .... Presumably a sense of contradiction and
discrepancy at one's own stage is necessary for re-
organization at the next stage, [pp. 402-403]
Turiel (1966) tested this hypothesis in a study involving
junior high school students. He found that exposure to the
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views of the stage Just above the subject's own, rather than
the stage directly below or two above that of the subject,
resulted in the greatest learning of a new mode of thought.
The method used was role-playing, where the child was ex-
posed to two contradictory solutions of a moral conflict
story, both of which were examples of stage thinking one
step above his own (or one below or two above, in the other,
non-significant conditions). Turiel notes
Since subjects were exposed to new modes ofthought through arguments Justifying both sides of
a moral conflict, they did not really receive solu-tions to the problems. Such a situation, which ex-posed subjects to cogent reasons Justifying two
contradictory positions, could have resulted in cog-
nitive conflict arising from an active concern withboth sides of the issue. When the arguments were
too 'simple,' as in the -1 treatment, the subjects
may not have become actively involved. When the
arguments were too 'complicated, 1 as in the +2
treatment, the subject may not have understood them.
However, exposure to concepts one stage above, con-
cepts within a subject's grasp, allowed him contact
with new contradictory ideas requiring thought. Per-
haps coping with concepts that had some meaning to
the subjects led to new modes of thinking, or to a
greater use of the stage that was one above the
initial stage, [p. 617]
How much of what a therapist says to his patient is either
rejected as too simple, or not comprehended because it is
out of the patient's realm of thinking? It may be possible
to employ techniques similar to Turiel 's, i.e., role-playing
in discussions of the Kohlberg stories, based on a knowledge
of the patient's stage of moral Judgment, in psychotherapy.
The goal would be the moral education of the patient, the
development of his capacity for reciprocal role-relationships.
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It may be useful to examine the area of moral development
and moral change in psychotherapy, with especial regard to
those therapies which stress moral issues and concerns.
Dealing with values, giving advice, and assuming a
good degree of responsibility for the patient's treatment
are not practices typically associated with psychotherapy.
An increasing number of therapists, however, are emphasizing
the importance of morality and responsibility in working
with patients, particularly severely disturbed patients.
Glasser's (1967) Reality Therapy aims at helping the pa-
tient
to acknowledge a set of values as early in thetherapy as possible. We then discuss his behaviorin terms of whether he thinks he is doing right or
wrong according to these values. There is usuallylittle difficulty in arriving at his values; thedifficulty lies in helping him to live responsibly
in accordance with them. [p. 129]
Glasser's contention, stated in different forms by
Buber and Kohlberg, is that self-respect and closeness to
others are the two basic needs of human beings. Clearly,
in Kohlberg's Stage 1 and 2 thinking, a stable self, mutual
relationship, and responsible living are impossible. So to
implement Glasser's ideas an effort would first have to be
made to expose the premoral patient to conventional judg-
ments, to stress responsibility, reciprocity, and a life
with others. The method of choosing the stage one above
the patient's to be the setting for discussion of conflicting
moral choices, and the findings indicating a natural moral
growth capacity in an upward direction, make the Kohlberg
moral development approach a logical adjunct to Glasser's
Reality Therapy. Glasser's model of emphasizing correct
and responsible actions may frequently be meeting the cri-
teria of moral development by presenting one-stage higher
concepts to premoral patients.
Mowrer (l 9 6l, 196H) has often written that the goal of
complete freedom for the patient is an inadequate one for
therapy. He comments,
My own growing conviction and that of others isthat we are crushed, not by the tyranny of the
culture but by our own short-sighted attempts to
evade the cultural demands and live, as we often say
'our own life!' [1964, p. 106 j y '
This is an apt description of Stage 1 and 2 thinking and
action, an attempt to live apart from others, with the re-
sulting failure and dissatisfaction.
Lederer (1967) also emphasizes the need to build up a
'"superego" in appropriate cases, and he calls this process
"pedagogic" therapy. Although his discussion employs psy-
choanalytic terms that may obscure the issue, he is also
promoting a life with others, a life based in society. The
therapist, or pedagogue, actively encourages and educates
the patient in the necessary capacities required for inter-
personal existence. Lederer (1971) feels this concern with
morality is justified, for
if desertion of morality indeed causes a sense of
alienation, and If alienation is the chief psychic
ailment of our times, then is it not the duty of the
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alienist the psychiatrist, to concern himselfwith morality, or rather, the lack of it, as, at
asjx? \;rihm of the posslble caus * s ° r lh*
Describing the role of the psychotherapist, Lederer (1971)
continues
Unlike the preacher, we do not advocate anyparticular code of ethics nor, by and large, are
we to prescribe any particular course of action.But we must, I think, insist with our patientsthat they consider the right and the wrong oftheir actions carefully in the light of their own
standards; that they expose their standards to
the buffeting of diverse opinion; and that theytry hard to identify and to dispel excuses and
rationalizations and to arrive at the essential
truth of their position, [p. 85]
The therapy hour can serve as a forum for discussion of
values and of moral issues. The Kohlberg system can create
some order out of the often confusing realm of morality.
It can explain moral Judgment in terms of developmental
stages, and it allows for a structural understanding of
different moral philosophies and the progression from stage
to stage. Whereas Lederer discusses morality in general
terms, Kohlberg is precise in his distinction between levels
of moral judgment, and this can be of great help to the
therapist
.
Lederer (1967) writes,
The pedagogue maintains, as pedagogues have
throughout history, that life is a game that can
be played in many ways. If one wishes to play it
well, he must first master it according to the
local ground rules [Stage 3 and 4 morality], and
the proper use of these rules permits considerable
freedom and spontaneity; greater freedom comes
from the recognition that the rules are largely
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Although the above discussion provides a surprisingly accu-
rate parallel to Kohlberg's sequence of stages, formal
analyses of both premoral and highly principled modes of
judgment are absent. In addition, a description of how
development of forms of "game-playing" occurs is lacking in
Lederer's treatment of morality. The Kohlberg stage schema
seems to provide a cogent example of how a' teaching-approach
or "pedagogic" therapy can actually be implemented. Relying
on his knowledge of the patient's level of moral judgment,
the therapist, or pedagogue, can employ the research find-
ings on moral change to help the patient move from more
primitive to more societal philosophies of existence. Once
at a conventional level, more subtle problems in living with
others can be dealt with by a variety of therapeutic tech-
niques. It would seem necessary, however, for the patient
to be initially helped, in an active fashion, to develop
beyond his premoral, asocial philosophy of life to a more
conventional socio-moral outlook. He needs to learn how to
operate within the system, at this stage in his development.
He needs to learn and to feel comfortable with the "ground
rules" of life in society.
This approach, using the Kohlberg constructs and tech-
niques to help the patient move along the sequence of stages,
is not aimed at fostering a blind conformity. As Glasser,
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Mowrer, Lederer, and others have maintained, an active role
for the therapist does not automatically imp i y a police
state or a therapy of conformity. More specifically, in
the Kohlberg system the most limited, rigid, and restricted
lives imaginable are those lived by Stage 1 and 2 moral
thinkers. Their physically oriented world is frequently
threatened by life situations, and their hermetic existences
make them susceptible to the slightest pressures. In con-
trast, the postconventlonal Stage 5 and 6 thinkers are free,
flexible, able to balance the demands of self and society,
and are even capable of stepping outside the society to
fight for personal principles of justice and reciprocity.
Sophisticated moral judgment leads not to a destruction of
the will, but to an emancipation of the will, the creation
of a will which rises above the self to include the world in
its concerns.
The therapist's values will become apparent in a morality
based therapy, but the goal is never the patient's acceptance
of the therapist's particular beliefs. The therapist may
model the various Kohlberg stage responses to moral dilemmas
in an attempt to help the patient develop new capacities in
resolving cognitive conflicts. Kohlberg writes in terms of
the existence of a natural trend to use more sophisticated
or complex stages of judgment, a natural growth capacity of
the moral judgment area. The moral-development approach is
not authoritarian, but educational in nature. The goal is
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to expose the patient to alternative modes of thought, not
to espouse any one moral philosophy or ethic. As Parlour,
Cole, and VanVorst (1967) write,
-...an active, directive'
stance by the psychotherapist need not inhibit personal
development or the development of mature independence and
responsibility [pp. 138-139]."
Indeed, a Kohlberg-oriented therapy would help to avoid
some of the limitations often found in morally based treat-
ment. Most importantly, the identification with and stress-
ing of a single moral concept or belief (e.g., Mowrer's em-
phasis on confession, Glasser's focussing on responsibility)
could be avoided by a therapist who worked within the format
of Kohlberg's stage theory. The distinction between a
teacher and a preacher is crucial here, and the aim of the
Kohlberg-oriented therapist would be to educate, not to con-
vert the patient to a particular philosophy of life. The
Kohlberg system is helpful in that it provides the therapist
with knowledge of a whole range of valid moral philosophies.
It is surely possible for the patient to rise to a
level above the therapist's, although his development into
the principled stages might well occur after the termination
of individual therapy. A solid conventional moral philoso-
phy, with an emphasis on responsibility and mutuality, may
leave the patient capable of maturing without the continued
process of individual assistance. The hypothesized need we
all have for community, the need to avoid lives of privacy,
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secrecy, and shame may perhaps be best alleviated by group
experiences, actual experiences of community.
Group psychotherapy, then, would appear to be an ini-
tial extension of the concern with moral judgment and inter-
personal life. Macnab (1965) maintains that
If Buber's thought is followed and accepted in
ffmSS
°
th™', the medlum of the Kroup assumes aundamental role and significance, for it is in
MmL?rSetti ing, that the Slck man mi Sht realizehimself and rediscover the meaning of his life inthe world, [p. 151]
The group-process has a more explicitly "moral" nature in
Mowrer's (1968) Integrity Therapy group, where the emphasis
is on confession of guilt and positive actions toward others
in the social world. Mowrer is concerned with and bothered
by the exclusively personal nature of most therapies, and he
sees the need to turn the patient toward the world, to break
up the secret and private milieu of therapy. He writes,
What a terrible waste of time it is seeing a
'counselor' who never counsels us to do anything
but continue talking to him! And group therapy,
while an Improvement over most individual counsel-
ing, can also fall short of full effectiveness if
it becomes ingrown and does not encourage its mem-
bers to reach out to, and often incorporate into
the group, 'significant others.' [p. 1^9]
The Kohlberg moral conflict stories can perhaps provide
a means of turning the group to broader, societal concerns.
By carefully selecting patients to insure a range of differ-
ent moral stages in the group, and by using a therapist who
understands the stage schema, the group could serve as a
setting for a discussion in which individuals would be
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exposed to a variety of .oral views. This would perhaps
result in patients' development from stage to stage. While
the group could deal with other, more traditional, issues,
this method of concentrating on moral conflict issues might
be especially helpful to the schizophrenic patient. Mowrer's
groups, stressing confession and responsibility, require a
good deal of social skills ana self-awareness, and there
would seem to be no place for the severely disturbed schizo-
phrenic within them. But if in addition to an Integrity
Therapy or other group therapy approach, the group dealt
directly with moral conflicts, the schizophrenics could be
exposed to higher stage thinking, and might better be able
to participate adequately by giving their own opinions. The
more they assimilated conventional modes of moral judgment,
the more the group as a whole could operate in a less struc-
tured fashion. The Kohlberg stories might be used, then, as
an adjunct to other therapies, individual and group. They
may be of particular Importance in their potential for bring-
ing the patient with the most alienated socio-moral world,
the schizophrenic, into closer contact with others and with
the community as a whole.
Conclusions and Implications
. Man faces many paradoxes
in life, but one of the most problematic of these is his
simultaneous need for both individuality and relationship
.
One's actions, it is hypothesized, have to satisfy both needs.
A balance must be established between the self and others.
This is the arena of morality, which deals with the nature
of the resolution of this conflict between man and society.
One extreme position stresses the individual, the self, but
the self seems to be unable to survive in social isolation.
On the other hand, to live purely for others is another
form of "losing" ourselves.
The Kohlberg framework describes the different forms
this attempt at "balance" or "stability," or, if you will,
"mental health," can take. For the psychotic, the non-
self of alienation is raised to unnatural, eerie heights,
and the Thou, or relation, is longed for in a private tor-
ment. Understanding the psychotic's level of moral judg-
ment makes more vivid the failures of their interpersonal
life, their unsatisfied need for connection and communion
with others. Higher moral stages, found in more "normal"
individuals, show an acknowledgment of the society, and
indicate some success in being a separate person while main-
taining a relationship to others. Identity is established
while relation is developed.
The moral-interpersonal realm deals with the person's
way of coping with this ontological paradox, and can add
further understanding to the concepts of what is "sick" and
what is "normal" behavior. This additional knowledge of
the person's cognitive mode of moral judgment could be es-
pecially helpful to a therapist who is actively concerned
with these same issues of self-in-society
. Man can be seen
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walking a tightrope, trying to keep his balance, to be an
individual, yet to live in relation with others. When he
slips, when he becomes "unbalanced," he falls into the
safety net of the mental health professions. It is our
responsibility to understand his problems and his failures,
and this implies understanding the way he lives as an in-
dividual with other people. The more knowledge we have
about moral judgment and interpersonal life, the more help
we can be to ouselves and to others. The more we understand
the various ways of living-in and out-of-community , the
better our "net" will be for catching the "fallen." For to
slip through the net means to leave this world, and drift
in a moral-interpersonal void. Our goal should be to send
the person back into the social world, back into the world
of the I and the Thou, more capable of fulfilling his dual
and inseparable needs for identity and relationship.
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APPENDIX A
Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview
I will read some stories to you, and after each story
I shall ask you some questions about the story. There are
no right or wrong answers to these questions, different
people have different opinions. I just want you to give
your own ideas and opinions. This is not a test and no one
in this hospital will see any of your answers.
89
S.7W0N I. joe is a 14-year-old boy who w»t*d to go to camp .cry much. HisJ /Tf I16 C° Uld 8° " he Saved u* money for it
« ^
6 W°rked at hlS Paper route and »aved up tne$40 it cost to co to camp and a little more besides. But justbefore camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Somfather was short of the money it would cost. The father told Joeto give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joedidn t want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusingto give his father the money.
I. 0. Should Joe refuse to give his father the toncy? W.r-?
90
2. Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give hin the
money? °
1. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
6. Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son
breaking a promise to his father?
6a. Why should a promise be kept?
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cancer.
UAT.OM HI. I Europe< a woman ^ death fl ^^^^ ^There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her.
discovered tS *™ * ta the Sarae t0"» h*d ™^
.
The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist wascharging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid §200for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug.The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to
^"V ! ?TeV bUt he °°uld ^ Set together about $1,000,which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wifewas dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later.'But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going tomake money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the
man s store to steal the drug for his wife.
III. 20. Should Heinz have done than? it actually wron, o, right?
23. Is it a husband's duty to steal the drug for his wife if he cancan get it no other way? Would a good huoband do it?
25. Did the druggist have the right to charge that rauch when there
was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why?
The next two questions apply only if subject thinks Heinz should steal thedrug : —— —
23a. If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his
wife, should he still steal the drug?
24. Suppose it wasn't Heinz 's wife who was dying of cancer, but it
was Heinz 's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and
there was no one in his fanily willing to steal the drug. Should
Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case? May?
'I
93
FT" ^ ^ « 11111 -~ ^Qd no. ...
Would you steal the dtu8 to save your wife's life?
If you were dying of cancer but were strong Pnn , idrug to save your own life? 8
e ouBh » would steal the
Everyone
Heinz broke In Che store and stole the drug and gave it to
En IofhL^ brought before the S*o»l/Z judE:° stealing, or should he let him
his wife. He
send Heinz to
b n go free? Why?
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six months to live?^
^i/teSibuTaiV^t^' ^ had °^ ab°uta good dose of pain-killer like »T„ „ V \ bu she was 80 ueak that
sooner. She was' delirious and al, ost llaZf,* T" "*? be* dleperiods, she would ask the doctor to Jit I P and ln her calmShe said she couldn't stand the Pain fnl th^ T"* eth" t0 kil1 her -few months anyway. hat she was Soing to die in a
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put"!' out Till
1S
<
b ''>dl
r
"°U "ded
°
nd WlU dl
=' " !• billed toit of its pain. Does the same thing apply here? Why?
S!Ll"°!uRa!
irtlon' applY onlv tf 8ub1ect ?<n"° the d°ct" —
• 41. Would you blame the doctor for giving her the drug?
42. What would have been best for the woman herself: to have lived
for six months more in great, pain or to have died sooner? Why?
The doctor finally deed fed co kill the woman Ko nut her out ofher pain, so he did it without consulting the law. The policefound out and the doctor « brought up on a charge ofMurderrhe jury decided he had done it, so they found him guilty of
'
K
Ch
°V?
thGy knP'W the wornan had^ him. Whatpunishment should the judge give the doctor: Why?
Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence?
Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in some
cases? Why?
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p.? •s.-t-a-a^-j .... », , „ m
money and slowly built up a Mcf^ u ^^ Ke S*vedhighest wa.es and used nost ofKit 8aVe his WOrkers
work in curing cancel Z n y ^tTS^LS^ 3 f° rrecognized the factorv n,mJ u 5 , "asseo when a tailor
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VIII. 80. Should the tailor report Reinz to the police? Would it beright or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?
81. Is it a citizen's duty to report Heinz? Would a good citizen?
84. If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor, would that make adifference? Why?
82. Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge? Why?

